In the hunt for the "Sultans of Smack:" dope, gangsters and the construction of the Turkish deep state by Gingeras, Ryan
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2011
In the hunt for the "Sultans of Smack:" dope,




R. Gingeras, "In the hunt for the "Sultans of Smack:" dope, gangsters and the
construction of the Turkish deep state,"  Middle East Journal, v.65, no.3 (Summer
2011), pp. 426-441.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56434
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL M VOLUME 65, NO. 3, SUMMER 2011
DOI: 10.3751/65.3.14
 In the Hunt for the “Sultans of Smack:” 
Dope, Gangsters and the Construction 
of the Turkish Deep State
Ryan Gingeras
This article traces the development and evolution of the Turkish heroin trade 
against the backdrop of the Republic of Turkey’s long transition from imperial core 
to nation-state. In taking up heroin’s relationship to modern Turkey, I would like 
to specifically explore the meaning and manifestations of what many inside and 
outside of academia have called the “deep state.” Heroin, I argue, was and is one 
of the most vital enablers of the factional “deep state” rivalries that compete for 
power in Ankara, adding a steady violent dimension to local and national politics.
Perhaps thankfully, we appear to have outlived the days when Turkey was synony-
mous with drugs. Popular Western media has by and large abandoned labored refer-
ences to Midnight Express and embraced a more pleasant and inviting image of Turkey 
as a delightful crossroads of tourism and trade. The intersection of dope, instability, 
and violence has instead shifted further east to Afghanistan, now unquestionably the 
beating heart of the world’s heroin trade. The Afghan state, we are told, has become 
a function of, and a hostage to, drugs. A successful conclusion in the war against the 
Taliban and al-Qa‘ida’s remnants, let alone the return of a stable and viable Afghan 
government, hinges on heroin’s defeat.
There was a time when contemporary Turkey was spoken of in similarly urgent 
terms. In the midst of the “smack epidemic” of the early 1970s, the United States under 
the Nixon Administration vigorously pressed Turkey to suppress its native opium crop. 
The tremendous political and economic pressure levied upon the Turkish government 
was indicative of not only a new brand of domestic conservatism in the White House, 
but also of the dire political context of the period. At this time, Turkey’s democracy 
looked increasingly tenuous. Violence between leftist and rightist factions plagued nu-
merous corners of the country. Ankara’s invasion of Cyprus in 1973 stoked fears of war 
between two NATO allies, leading to concerns that American efforts to forestall Soviet 
influence in the eastern Mediterranean would collapse. In short, much depended upon 
Ankara’s ability to right its ship of state. 
That storm has long since passed. Turkish democracy, despite a series of direct 
military interventions at the top, has proven solvent. Disagreements over the wars in 
neighboring Iraq have tested, but not undone, Turkey’s economy or Ankara’s relation-
ship with the United States and Western Europe. Beneath this façade of stability and 
cooperation, drugs and violence continue to loom large within the Turkish body politic. 
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Arguably, Turkey’s presence in the international drug trade has not only grown, but 
also diversified. More importantly, several bloody scandals in the last two decades have 
served to remind the Turkish public of the profound effect narcotic traffickers have 
upon the management of domestic affairs. Yet unlike the 1970s, a shroud of silence 
muffles much, if any, discussion of the weight of these issues.
 This article follows in the footsteps of several prominent scholars who have at-
tempted to reevaluate how narcotics have helped shape the modern world. In approach-
ing the development of the modern Turkish Republic, I wish to put the heroin trade 
at the center of this state’s long transition from imperial core to nation-state. Rather 
than exile heroin to the margins of the historical development of state institutions, I 
intend to give the centrality of narcotics the same discursive legitimacy as other pivotal 
resources in the Middle East. Like the role of oil in constructing the modern states of 
Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, or Iran, one cannot fully understand the modern Republic of 
Turkey without gauging the local, national, and transnational forces related to the flow 
of heroin in, through, and out of Asia Minor.
Although there are certain basic similarities between crude oil and opium sap 
(both are unrefined, relatively inelastic products that have taken on increasing impor-
tance in the modern era), it is not my intention to press the petroleum analogy too far. In 
taking up heroin’s relationship to modern Turkey, I would like to specifically explore the 
meaning and manifestations of what many inside and outside of academia have called 
the “deep state.” The term itself in Turkey (derin devlet) has raised eyebrows and blood 
pressures for several decades now. Colloquially speaking, it is used to refer to “criminal” 
or “rogue” elements that have somehow muscled their way into power. Such actors are 
too often described as marginal interlopers who have somehow invaded and poisoned 
the genuine and pure Turkish body politic. In this article, I opt for a broader definition of 
the characteristics and players that comprise the “deep state.” Over the following pages I 
wish to use the shifts within the global heroin trade as means to chart and explain certain 
core conflicts within the modern development of the Turkish state. Heroin, I will argue, 
was and is one of the most vital enablers of the factional rivalries that compete for power 
in Ankara, adding a steady violent dimension to local and national politics.
FROM OTTOMAn SAp TO TuRkISH SMAck: A BRIEF HISTORy OF 
TuRkISH HEROIn
The trade and consumption of opium, the raw sap drawn from the poppy plant, 
appears to have followed lockstep with the development of organized society since 
antiquity. Its presence within the grand Mediterranean marketplace can be dated back 
to as early as the Bronze Age.1 One may say, with a tinge of irony, that the cornerstone 
of the Ottoman Empire rests somewhere within a field of poppies. Osman Gazi, the 
Empire’s titular founder, was born in the town of Söğüt, a sleepy place lying within 
a day’s travel from the lush fields surrounding modern-day Afyon (meaning poppy in 
Turkish). By the time of his great grandson, Bayezit I, the state Osman had engendered 
would encompass much of the Anatolian lands best suited for the production of opium. 
1. Alfred McCoy, The politics of Heroin: cIA complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Chicago: 
Lawrence Hill Books, 2003), p. 3. 
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In addition to the territory lying between Afyon and Yozgat, peasants and traders made 
the poppy a staple crop in the environs of Aydın, Balıkesir, Kütahya, Konya, İsparta, 
and elsewhere in western and central Anatolia.
Opium appeared to have no great impact upon the Ottoman Empire until the 19th 
century. Contrary to the popular images favored by Orientalist artists and writers (i.e., 
a moderately stoned Ottoman efendi relaxing casually with his waterpipe), consump-
tion of opium as a narcotic was limited. Both the seed and the sap from the poppy were 
instead used for a variety of purposes, such as for cooking oil, flavoring (such as in 
bread), and medicinal purposes. Although neither Muslim nor Christian farmers mo-
nopolized the harvesting of opium, trade in poppy-related products became associated 
with Armenians by the 19th century.2
Events half a world away transformed opium’s status in Anatolia at the turn of 
the 19th century. from their vast holdings in Bengal, agents of the East India Trading 
Company conceived of a radical plan to penetrate and subvert the Chinese marketplace. 
The illicit trafficking of British-Indian opium reaped a terrible windfall of profit for the 
East India Trading Company at the expense of addicts along China’s southern coast. 
When the ruling Qing dynasts attempted to thwart further sale of British opium to its 
population, war was declared. The outcome of the first Opium War served not only to 
solidify Western colonial interests in East Asia, but also to transform China into the 
global epicenter of opium consumption during the ensuing decades.3 
The Ottoman government responded to the dramatic rise in demand for opium 
by instituting a state monopoly (yed-i vahet) on the drug. Under the yed-i vahet, poppy 
production and profits soared. Although never rivalling the production capabilities of 
Bengal, Ottoman opium would at one point account for 10% of China’s overall con-
sumption of the drug.4 By mid-century, cargo ships transporting Ottoman opium in-
creasingly plotted a westerly course towards Great Britain and the United States. By 
the turn of the 20th century, Ottoman opium accounted for anywhere between 66% and 
89% of American consumption.5
At first, the Ottoman government hoped that this increasing demand for the pop-
py’s tar would provide a needed financial lifeline. Proceeds gleaned from the state’s 
control over the trade, instituted in 1828, flowed directly into the newly reformed Otto-
man military. However, direct state control over the production of Ottoman opium did 
not last long. In 1838, a year before the sweeping reforms undertaken by Sultan Abdül-
mecid I, Great Britain compelled Istanbul to abandon its monopoly over all agricultural 
products. Thereafter, Western merchants and manufacturers swarmed over Anatolia’s 
poppy crop, dominating all aspects of the Ottoman opium trade (with the exception of 
2. İbrahim İhsan Poroy, “Expansion of Opium Production in Turkey and the State Monopoly 
of 1828–1839,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (May 1981), p. 196; 
A. Üner Turgay, “The Nineteenth Century Golden Triangle: Chinese Consumption, Ottoman Pro-
duction, and the American Connection, II,” International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 
(1984–1985), pp. 65–66.
3. for further reference on this subject, please see Alfred McCoy, “Heroin as a Global Commodity: 
A History of Southeast Asia’s Opium Trade,” in Alfred McCoy and Alan Block, eds., War on Drugs: 
Studies in the Failure of u.S. narcotics policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 237–279.
4. Poroy, “Expansion of Opium Production in Turkey and the State Monopoly of 1828–1839,” p. 192. 
5. Turgay, “The Nineteenth Century Golden Triangle,” p. 93.
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its harvesting of course).6 This would remain the case well into the 20th century.
As the demand for Ottoman opium grew through the early 20th century, a revolu-
tion in the drug’s consumption was slowly taking place. The identification and extrac-
tion of morphine, the addictive component in opium, would lead to a new and booming 
industry of mass-produced pain medication. Nascent pharmaceutical giants like Merck 
and Bayer were among the first to capitalize on this new product. The second great turn 
in opium’s long history would occur in 1875 with the invention of heroin, a synthetic 
intoxicant comprising an admixture of morphine and acetic anhydride.7 Heroin soon 
joined an emerging pantheon of new and readily available narcotics (such as cocaine) 
found over the counter throughout the Western world. 
By the turn of the 20th century, heroin’s entrance into the public domain spawned 
a gathering wave of hysteria in the West regarding the effects that the drug held over 
society. At its root, debates over the consumption of heroin, along with cocaine or 
marijuana, comprised an important tangent within broader concerns over the racial 
and imperial insecurities found within both the United States and Great Britain.8 By 
the outbreak of World War I, Washington and London had taken strong steps to curtail, 
and eventually prohibit, both the sale and consumption of heroin at both a domestic 
and international level. These efforts came to final fruition with the convening of the 
International Opium Convention in The Hague in 1912. The Ottoman Empire, still one 
of the largest producers of opium at the turn of 20th century, undersigned neither the 
Hague agreement nor a similar convention laid out in Versailles in 1919. 
The empire’s collapse and its reconstitution as the Turkish Republic under 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk did not change this fact. International pressure upon Turkey, 
again with the United States in the lead, continued unabated into the early 1930s. 
During the first years of the young Republic, Western and Japanese firms operated 
a series of factories in Istanbul tasked with processing raw Anatolian opium into 
morphine.9 Despite a declared eagerness to halt the sale of the illicit drug, contra-
band Turkish dope continued to find its way into the Western marketplace with little 
governmental oversight.10 Ankara’s promise to curb factory production of morphine 
and ban the trafficking of heroin in 1931 ultimately proved to be cosmetic.11 Turk-
6. Poroy, “Expansion of Opium Production in Turkey and the State Monopoly of 1828–1839,” p. 202.
7. McCoy, “Heroin as a Global Commodity,” pp. 5–6.
8. See, for example, Anne foster, “Prohibiting Opium in the Philippines and the United States: 
The Creation of an Interventionist State,” in Alfred McCoy and francisco Scarano, eds., colonial 
crucible Empire in the Making of the Modern American State (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2009), pp. 95–105; Dominic Streatfeild, cocaine: A Definitive History (London: Virgin Books, 
2001), pp. 142–179. 
9. f. Cengiz Erdinç, Overdose Türkiye: Türkiye’de Eroin kaçakçılığı, Bağımlılğı ve politikalar 
[Overdose Turkey: Heroin Smuggling, Addiction and politics] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), pp. 
53–69; W. Kernick, “Turkish Drug Trade Presents Problem,” The new york Times, January 18, 1931.
10. Alan Block, “European Drug Traffi ck and Traffi ckers between the Wars: The Policy of Sup-
pression and its Consequences,” Journal of Social History, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1989), pp. 315–337; 
Clarence Streit, “Vast Narcotic Ring Revealed in Europe,” The new york Times, October 21, 1930; 
Clarence Streit, “Narcotics ‘Lost’ Exceed Seven Tons,” The new york Times, December 19, 1930.
11. Arnold Taylor, American Diplomacy and the narcotics Traffick, 1900–1939 (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1969); “Turkey Restricts Narcotic Output,” The new york Times, february 23, 
1931; “Would Destroy Narcotics,” The new york Times, June 30, 1931.
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ish opium continued its steady trickle out of Anatolia well until the outbreak of the 
World War II.
In order to understand the evolution of the trade in Turkish heroin in the immedi-
ate pre- and post-war period, one must look closely at the intricate transnational net-
work that fostered and enabled its sale. Turkey remained throughout this period only the 
supplier for the raw material necessary to produce heroin. Processing and shipping were 
industries instead controlled by an array of multinational actors. A smattering of Jewish, 
Greek, and Lebanese merchants and smugglers led the way for most of the interwar pe-
riod. Scholars continue to debate the roles American and Italian organized crime figures 
played during this period. for the most part, like cocaine up until the 1970s, trafficking 
in heroin remained an ad hoc or “mom and pop” business until the 1950s.12
A new global order seems to have gripped the heroin trade after World War 
II. Warrants and government crackdowns in both the United States and fascist Italy 
served to severely hamper (but not end) the business dealings of the La Cosa Nostra 
crime families and their affiliates on both sides of the Atlantic. The effects of the De-
pression and fighting on the high seas produced a drought in both the production and 
consumption ends of the spectrum worldwide. The new prosperity of postwar Ameri-
ca was accompanied by a steady increase in the use of narcotics.13 By the mid-1950s, 
an emerging collective of transporters began to assume a large portion of opium’s 
flow out of the eastern Mediterranean. US narcotics officials maintained for much of 
the Cold War that a conglomerate of Corsican Mafiosi controlled much of the opium 
traded out of Turkey via Beirut (the main entrepot of Turkish opiates).14 Between 
1948 and 1967, the federal Bureau of Narcotics (fBN), grandfather of Washington’s 
contemporary Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), maintained a regular sta-
tion of officers tasked with “assisting” local police in investigating and prosecuting 
both traffickers and producers connected to the Turkish end of the “french Connec-
tion.” Bureaucratic resistance (rooted in both corruption and national pride) and the 
lack of funds from Washington only partly hindered American efforts in Turkey. As 
of 1958, one fBN officer reported that it was impossible to make a case against major 
violators due to the amount of political and economic influence wielded by Turkish 
kingpins in Istanbul.15
The impact that the “french Connection” would have upon American society ulti-
mately resounded within the halls of the White House. In the midst of the social upheav-
al and emerging counter-culture of the late 1960s, President Richard Nixon seized upon 
the heroin issue with a vengeance. At the center of this campaign was Turkey, which, 
12. McCoy, politics of Heroin, pp. 24–30; Kathryn Meyer and Terry Parssinen, Web of Smoke: 
Smugglers, Warlords, Spies and the History of the International Drug Trade (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), pp. 281–286.
13. Jill Jonnes, Hep-cats, narcs and pipe Dreams: A History of America’s Romance with Illegal 
Drugs (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 119–140.
14. See, for example, Directorate of Intelligence, “The french-Turkish Connection: The 
Movement of Opium and Morphine Base from Turkey to france (December 1971),” CIA-RDP 
73B00296R000300070022-8, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park, MD.
15. Memorandum Report, Bureau of Narcotics, District 17 (re: Turkey), October, 22 1958; Turkey, 
1957–1959; Subject files of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 1916–1970; Records of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration, Record Group 170; National Archives Building II, Silver Spring, MD.
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according to officially cited sources, produced 80% of the heroin consumed by addicts 
in the United States. It was immaterial that some government sources placed Turkey’s 
contribution to the global drug trade much lower (perhaps between 3 and 8%); the Ad-
ministration argued that more “dramatic results” could be attained in Turkey as opposed 
to declaring a drug war in Laos, Thailand, or Burma.16 It is possible that Nixon’s motiva-
tions may have also been the product of international, as well as domestic, concerns. In 
addition to the havoc caused by Turkish and Greek tensions over the fate of the island of 
Cyprus, recently declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents suggest that 
the heroin trade was also a destabilizing force in Iran (which according to one memoran-
dum purportedly possessed one quarter of the world’s opium users).17
Discussions between US and Turkish officials over the issue of heroin were first 
held in January 1970. Turkey’s response to US overtures was allegedly courteous, but 
shaded with reluctance.18 Production of opium, Ankara claimed, was conducted under 
clear government supervision. In 1967, the state had banned the harvesting of poppies 
in all but 12 of the 21 previously existing opium-producing provinces (this number was 
was ultimately reduced to four). State regulators in Afyon, Denizli, İsparta, and other 
provinces paid a set price for the sap and saw to it that the crop made its way to legally-
sanctioned manufacturers of morphine. Yet with smugglers paying twice the going gov-
ernmental rate ($11 a kilo in 1970) and hundreds of thousands depending upon opium 
production as a source of income, leakage was inevitable.19
Turkey, on “humanitarian grounds,” ultimately agreed in 1971 to ban the opium 
poppy.20 $35 million in American aid, directed at economic and policing assistance, 
helped to sweeten the deal. In the shadow of the Vietnam War, Nixon heralded the 
agreement as a whopping success. The accord, the President declared, was “by far the 
most significant breakthrough that has been achieved in stopping the source of heroin 
in our worldwide offensive against dangerous drugs.”21
At first Nixon was largely correct. State forces clamped down hard on local grow-
ers. Peasants throughout Anatolia responded rancorously as greater poverty and starva-
tion loomed.22 In 1974, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, who had campaigned against the 
16. Edward Epstein, Agency of Fear: Opiates and political power in America (London: Verso, 
1999), pp. 86–89.
17. CIA/ORR/OTI, Job SOTO 1315A, Box 24, folder S-3686-S3716, “Subject: Production in 
Iran,” p. 2.
18. “Turkey Agrees at Meeting to Tighten Curbs on Opium,” The new york Times, January 23. 1970.
19. felix Belair, “U.S. Loan to Turkey Dismays Narcotics Offi cials,” The new york Times, June 
14, 1970; Directorate of Intelligence, “The french-Turkish Connection: The Movement of Opium 
and Morphine Base from Turkey to france (December 1971);” Alfried friendly, “Turkish Program 
Curbing Opium Poppy,” The new york Times, June 11, 1970; “Turkey Rebuffs U.S. on Opium Ban,” 
The new york Times, September 11, 1970. 
20. Terence Smith, “Turkish Premier Vows to Halt Illicit Opium Traffi c,” The new york Times, 
May 2, 1971.
21. John Herbers, “Nixon Says Turks Agree to Ban the Opium Poppy,” The new york Times, June 
30, 1971.
22. Henry Kamm, “Turkish farmers See Poverty in Ban on the Poppy,” The new york Times, Oc-
tober 3, 1973; Juan de Onus, “Opium Poppy Gone, Turkish farmers Ask Why Has U.S. Done This to 
Us?,” The new york Times, August 9, 1973; Steven Roberts, “Turkish farmers Insist the Opium Poppy 
is Still Staff of Life,” The new york Times, May 11, 1974.
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ban as a parliamentary candidate, announced that opium production would resume but 
under a far tighter regime of government control. To the dismay of the White House, 
Necmettin Erbakan, head of the National Salvation Party, stated that, in addition to the 
suffering of tens of thousands of farmers, legitimate demand on the part of pharmaceu-
tical companies for high-grade Turkish opium compelled the government to change its 
mind.23 Carl Sulzburger, who was The new york Times’ foremost foreign correspondent 
at the time, noted in an emboldened headline that, “Turks cannot even imagine the hor-
rors of mass addiction among American youth.”24
Unbeknownst to this heir of the Times’ fortune and Washington policymakers, the 
threat of Turkish heroin would eventually diminish, only to be replaced by a larger, far 
graver problem. As a result of a combination of factors exclusive of Ankara’s policies 
(such as the end of the “french Connection”), Turkish heroin was slowly losing its 
principle status as a drug of choice among American addicts. Through the enterprising 
efforts of the Ochoa brothers, Carlos Lehder, Pablo Escobar, and many others, South 
American coke burst upon the global drug scene by the mid-1970s.25 It must be noted 
that the emergence of cocaine in the 1970s was not a purely organic, market-produced 
phenomenon. Under the auspices of Cold War politics, collaboration between traffick-
ing syndicates and clandestine agents affiliated with the US and various South Ameri-
can governments did much to turn cocaine into a lucrative vehicle used in part to fund 
combative efforts against perceived Soviet encroachment.26 
Despite the decline, but not total elimination, of the Turkish heroin trade, drug 
trafficking did not disappear from Turkey during the closing decades of the 20th cen-
tury. If anything, Turkey’s role in the drug trade expanded and took on new dimensions. 
During the last two decades of the century, Asia Minor became a node of distribution, 
transit, and production of illegal narcotics. Heroin smuggled from Central Asia (which 
had formerly provided opium to local markets in South Asia and Iran), amphetamines, 
and other synthetic narcotics have increasingly made their way via this portion of the 
eastern Mediterranean. A stable series of trade routes have solidified among portions 
of the Turkish diaspora in Europe and within the former Ottoman lands of Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro.27 These phenomena, historically speak-
ing, are entirely new, marking a dramatic shift away from the country’s role as a pas-
sive supplier to an active and ostensibly autonomous manufacturer and dispenser of 
illicit drugs. American interests have also taken a different turn in the years between the 
23. “Turk is Bringing Opium Message,” The new york Times, March 13, 1974; “Turkey Asks U.S. 
Ideas on Opium Curbs,” The new york Times, July 8, 1974.
24. C.L. Sulzberger, “The Opium of the People,” The new york Times, August 24, 1974.
25. Andres Lopez Restrepo and Alvaro Camacho Guizado, “from Smugglers to Warlords: Twen-
tieth Century Colombian Drug Traffickers,” canadian Journal of Latin American & caribbean Stud-
ies, Vol. 28, Nos. 55–56 (2003), pp. 249–263; Streatfeild, cocaine, pp. 218–280.
26. for further reading on the “deep politics” of the drug trade and South American politics, see 
Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, cocaine politics: Drugs, Armies and the cIA in central 
America (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998); Gary Webb, Dark Alliance: The cIA, 
the contras and the crack cocaine Explosion (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998).
27. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, “The french Connection In Real Life,” The new york 
Times, february 6, 1972. According to sources cited by The new york Times, the development of 
smuggling network among members of the Turkish diaspora in Europe may have been initiated by 
the “french Connection.”
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Nixon and second Bush administrations. In comparison to Mexico and Columbia (to 
name just a couple of examples), Washington appears to maintain a more understated 
or moderate presence in drug enforcement activities in Turkey.28 
With the increasing strength and complexity that has marked the most recent turn 
in Turkey’s role within narcotics trafficking, several key questions remain unanswered. 
Who are the figures that run the drug trade and what are the internal and external dy-
namics that govern trafficking enterprises in Turkey? How large is Turkey’s contribu-
tion to the contemporary heroin market and how were traffickers able to recover and 
then expand their base of operations after 1974? Perhaps most important of all, what 
effect has the drug had over the Turkish political and economic systems? At best, I can 
only offer partial answers. But in stating these questions, I wish to offer an alternative 
strategy in the hopes of excavating this largely suppressed aspect of Turkish history. 
Perhaps, I would argue, it is best to delve first into the history of what one could call 
“organized crime” in Turkey and the ways in which criminal syndicates have shaped 
the course of Anatolia’s transition from empire to nation-state. If this history is jux-
taposed with the evolution of modern heroin trafficking, one notices several striking 
moments of overlying interests.
THE MAkInG OF A SMAck SuLTAn: REASSESSInG ORGAnIzED 
cRIME AnD pARAMILITARISM In AnATOLIA
Contemporary analogies aside, a singular Turkish mafia has never existed.29 One 
cannot find a region or a subculture within Anatolia that possesses or has produced 
organizations or phenomena akin to the Camorra of Naples or even the tong brother-
hoods of southern China.30 That is not to say, however, that organized crime in Turkey 
does not exist or is without historical precedent. In this section, I will trace the modern 
28. Karen Tandy, “United States Policy towards Narco-Terrorism,” presented before the Com-
mittee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, february 12, 2004, http://www.
usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct021204.htm. According to Tandy’s testimony, the DEA (in addition 
to British customs officials) has largely taken a limited supporting role in assisting Turkish security 
personnel in apprehending suspected drug traffickers in Turkey. The largest bust cited by Tandy was 
the discovery of 495 kilos of pure heroin in 2002. By the DEA’s own accounting, over 1,200 tons of 
heroin were produced in Afghanistan that year alone. 
29. See Ryan Gingeras, “Beyond Istanbul’s ‘Laz Underworld:’ Ottoman Paramilitarism and the 
Rise of Turkish Organized Crime, 1908–1950,” Journal of contemporary European History, Vol. 19, 
No. 3 (2010), pp. 215–230.
30. There is some debate over whether or not the contemporary mafi a is somehow linked with tradi-
tional kabadayı figures residing in cities throughout the Ottoman Empire. Local strongmen, or kabadayı, 
have historically asserted themselves as business or personal mediators in working class and poor neigh-
borhoods. Most were managers of bathhouses, cafés, and firemen. Many of the more prominent organ-
ized figures in recent years, such as Dündar Kılıç, have claimed the title of kabadayı for themselves. In 
terms of the overlap of drug trafficking and organized crime in Turkey, there is as of yet no evidence that 
kabadayı figures played a role in the development of the trade in the country. More to the point, there 
are those (like Kılıç) who have argued that kabadayılar and mafiosi are distinct and separate phenom-
ena. See frank Bovenkerk and Yücel Yeşilgöz, The Turkish Mafia: A History of the Heroin Godfathers 
(Lancs, UK: Milo Books, 2007), pp. 77–82; Ulaş Yıldız, “nerede O Eski ‘Dayılar’” [“Where are the Old 
kabadayı?], Radikal, March 7, 2001; Doğan Yurdakul, Abi: kabadayıler-Mafya Derin Devlet İlişkilsi 
[Older Brother: kabadayı-Mafia-Deep State Relations] (Istanbul: Positif Yayınları, 2007), p. 36. 
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origins of Turkish criminal syndicates and how they relate to heroin trafficking and to 
the development of the Turkish state. Despite what the title of this article may appear 
to promise, I do not intend to unmask some great Turkish smack baron in the mould 
of Pablo Escobar or Kaiser Sozay. Instead, I would like to draw attention to moments 
in the recent past when mobsters, heroin trafficking, and politics have intersected and 
made their presence known to the Turkish public. Rather than treat such moments as 
isolated events or unrepresentative of contemporary Turkish society, I would like to 
integrate such intersections into a much broader, nuanced understanding of the conti-
nuities between the Ottoman past and the Turkish present.
Historians of the Ottoman Empire are readily familiar with the prominent roles 
bandits played in both forming and contesting the limits of the imperial administration 
in Anatolia. During the 17th and 18th centuries, bandits were at the same time the scourge 
of a stable empire and the source of invaluable troops and administrators.31 By the 19th 
century, the term “bandit” (şaki or eşkiya) was reserved for the most marginal and trou-
blesome elements in Ottoman society, such as migrants, refugees, and other transient 
peoples. Although the terms “bandit” and “banditry” continued to be used into the 20th 
century, I would argue that the nature of armed criminal syndicates was rapidly changing 
towards the end of the imperial period. Rather than independently-run cohorts organized 
for the purposes of theft or extortion, gangs in Anatolia increasingly became the tools of 
political actors with specific social or economic agendas. Although some may argue that 
the “social bandit” (à la Robin Hood) may have never existed, I would argue that crimi-
nal syndicates took on an increasingly political veneer as institutionalized factions and 
functions inside and outside of the state. for this reason, I would classify many Ottoman 
criminals in the 20th century as paramilitaries rather than simple bandits.
One could say that the very last Ottoman regime was the product and beneficiary 
of organized crime and paramilitarism. The Revolution of 1908, which led to the for-
mation of the Young Turk government of 1908–1918, was made possible through the 
assistance of “political gangs” loyal to Muslim notables in Ottoman Macedonia. The 
origins of this political alliance between the Young Turk revolutionaries and Muslim 
(largely Albanian) gangs in Macedonia was the byproduct of an ongoing collaboration 
between the two factions in an effort to stymie the work of separatist insurgents in the 
region during the first two decades of the 20th century.32 
With the establishment of the de facto Young Turk dictatorship in 1913, this al-
liance was expanded and given new meaning. Shortly before taking power, members 
of the inner circle of the imperial administration laid the foundation for an ambitious, 
multi-faceted clandestine arm called the Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa). 
According to all available sources, the Special Organization drew a broad array of offi-
cers, officials, professionals, and notables into its upper ranks. Covert operations run by 
these agents extended into both international and domestic spheres. fanning rebellion 
abroad, special recruitment, and political assassinations each fell under the mandate of 
31. fredrick Anscombe, “Albanians and ‘Mountain Bandits,’” in fredrick Anscombe, ed., The Ot-
toman Balkans 1750–1830 (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006); Karen Barkey, Bandits 
and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State centralization (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1994).
32. Şükrü Hanioğlu, preparation for a Revolution: The young Turks, 1902–1908 (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 221–227, 254–258. 
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this political organ. 
Among the groups that buttressed this newly created arm of the Ottoman state 
was an unknown series of provincial criminal syndicates. We know precious little about 
the full extent and character of these networks (which arguably could be found in every 
province in what remained of the Ottoman Empire). Yet, we can advance a few impor-
tant generalizations. One critical source of recruitment for the paramilitary units used 
to execute the Armenian Genocide (an operation that was in part assigned to the Special 
Organization) was provincial gangs comprising recent Muslim immigrants from both 
the Balkans and the North Caucasus. In addition to running a variety of rackets (such 
as extortion, smuggling, and theft), many of these provincial gangs were employed as 
private militias for competing local interests within their home provinces. With the out-
break of World War I, the Special Organization called upon local notables (who could 
have been either landowners, merchants, or even appointed imperial officials) to supply 
their militias for state service.33 Although the exact budget of the Special Organization 
is unknown to us (in fact it was kept secret from the Ottoman parliament as well), it 
may be surmised that this recruitment campaign was at least in part financed with prop-
erty seized from murdered or deported non-Muslims.34 Considering Istanbul’s grander 
plans for the Ottoman economy, the transfer of stolen goods into the hands of hired 
assassins from the North Caucasus or the Balkans would have neatly coincided with 
the state’s program to undermine or destroy the economic positions held by Armenians 
and Greeks in the Empire.35 
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the founding of the Republic of Turkey 
greatly unsettled Anatolia’s criminal underworld. Many paramilitaries and gangsters 
who had previously been employed by the Special Organization were arrested, mur-
dered, or exiled following a string of rebellions against the emerging Ankara govern-
ment. Mustafa Kemal’s ascendancy as President of the young Republic formally put 
an end to the Special Organization apparatus. A pivotal movement in this turn away 
from the Ottoman clandestine service occurred after a supposed attempt upon Mustafa 
Kemal’s life in 1927. With the closing of the Izmir show trials, the last of several promi-
nent Special Organization operatives were put to death or sentenced to long prison 
terms. In 1926, the Gazi laid the foundation for a new clandestine arm, ultimately to 
be renamed the National Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı [MİT]) 
in 1965. Like many other state organs created during the Kemalist period, MİT’s ap-
paratus was staffed by loyal veterans of Mustafa Kemal’s push for power and was a 
seemingly direct appendage of the ruling Republican Peoples’ Party (RPP).36 
33. See, for example, Ryan Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity and the End of the 
Ottoman Empire (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 55–77.
34. Material gain, in either property or money, was often a central motivating factor for many 
who engaged in the deportation and murder of non-Muslims during World War II. See, for example, 
Stephan Astourian, “The Silence of the Land,” in Ronald Grigor Suny, fatma Müge Göçek, and Nor-
man M. Naimark, eds., A Question of Genocide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 55–81; 
PRO/ fO 371/4158/105778, June 27, 1919.
35. See Ryan Gingeras, “Last Rites for a ‘Pure Bandit:’ Clandestine Service, Historiography and the 
Origins of the Turkish ‘Deep State,’” past & present, Vol. 206, No. 1 (february 2010), pp. 121–144.
36. Gültekin Ural, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’dan MİT’e: Abdullah Çatlı ve Susurluk Olayı [From the Spe-
cial Organization to MİT: Abdullah Çatlı and the Susurluk Incident] (Istanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 1997). 
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Until 1931, most of the major wholesalers in heroin were of foreign origin.37 As 
one scans the records of the fBN, only one name appears in reports detailing local in-
volvement in the trade. Nesim Toranto, an otherwise legitimate exporter, is said to have 
had extensive connections in the world of narcotics (including ties with Arnold Roth-
stein, arguably the single most powerful individual in American organized crime dur-
ing the 1920s). Despite having lost considerable sums of money during World War II 
(under the auspices of the Varlik Vergisi, a wartime tax regime that particularly targeted 
non-Muslim business interests), the Toranto family appears to have been connected to 
the narcotics trade well into the 1950s.38 After 1931, the withdrawal of Western and 
Japanese interests from Istanbul begot a new generation of native traffickers who had 
previously served as local apprentices. It is out of this cohort that the first generation of 
Turkish drug lords emerged.
 field reports from American narcotics officers tell us that Istanbul was a hotbed 
of narcotics activity during the 1950s. Istanbul’s drug underworld was dominated by a 
handful of men who supplied Corsican and freelance traffickers alike. Most came from 
“minority” backgrounds (primarily Laz or Orthodox Christians).39 Through these men, 
hires could procure “junk” to allied transporters based in Kilis (a southern Anatolian 
border town with a direct line to marketeers in Beirut). During these more innocent 
days in the trade, a determined Westerner could procure products by simply walking 
into local bars in the city (as George White, the first American narcotics official to fight 
the American war on drugs in Turkey, found out in 1948).40 That is not to say that major 
traffickers in Istanbul did not have friends in high places. 
Considering the degree to which the legal opium trade was regulated by Ankara, 
one is compelled to ask what roles politicians played in the illicit trafficking of heroin 
in and out of Turkey. The strange case of Turkish senator Küdret Bayhan offers us some 
hint as to the depth and profundity of the link between political and underworld figures. 
In March 1971, the senator from Niğde (who recently became a representative of the 
right-wing National Action Party) was arrested on the french/Italian border carrying 
146 kilos of morphine. This scandal led to the arrest of three other elected officials. 
American law enforcement agents who purportedly played a key role in Bayhan’s ar-
rest later admitted to The new york Times that many Turkish citizens carrying official 
or “red” passports were often employed as couriers between Turkey and Marseilles.41 
37. The International Opium Convention: Point of View of the Turkish Producers, Traders, and 
Manufacturers, 1930; Turkey, 1930–1934; Subject files of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs, 1916–1970; Records of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Record Group 170; National 
Archives Building II, Silver Spring, MD.
38. William Garland to Mr. H. J. Anslinger, October 21, 1949; Turkey, 1949–1950; Subject files of the 
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 1916–1970; Records of the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, Record Group 170; National Archives Building II, Silver Spring, MD; “yüce Divana Sevki İstenen 
Eski Bakanlar” [“Old Ministers Transferred to the Supreme Court”], Milliyet, January 22, 1952.
39. Gingeras, “Beyond Istanbul’s ‘Laz Underworld,’” pp. 222–225. 
40. Letter from George White to Harry J. Anslinger, June 10, 1948, George W. White Papers, Box 
1, folder 7, Special Collections Department, Stanford University.
41. Edward Herman and frank Brodhead, The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian connection (New 
York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1986), p. 58; Henry Kamm, “Turkish Ban on Poppy: Delayed 
Impact Seen,” The new york Times, October 10, 1972); Altan Öymen, “Çocuğa de bir kırmızı pasa-
port” [“A Red Passport also for Children”], Radıkal, february 26, 2006.
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If we accept the case of Küdret Bayhan as a possible window into this aspect of the 
drug trade in Turkey, it may be suggested that politicians at both the local and national 
levels had (and continue to have) important parts to play. Thinking comparatively, such 
alliances are not that uncommon. The contemporary state of Mexico, which, much like 
Turkey, was established upon a series of both statist and populist revolutionary prin-
ciples, has evolved in locked step with the trafficking of illegal narcotics. Perhaps it is 
not too unfounded to suggest that the development of provincial political networks in 
such states as Baja California Norte, Sinaloa, or Michocan may possess strong com-
monalities with the development of such Turkish provinces as Malatya, Afyon, Aydın, 
or Trabzon.42 
Neither the curtailment of opium production nor a “serious” crackdown on orga-
nized crime following Kenan Evren’s military coup in 1980 dealt a fatal blow to the 
Turkish underworld. Rather, at this point when Turkey’s role in the drug trade became 
more diversified and self-sustaining, criminal syndicates took on an increasingly politi-
cal veneer. One reason for this may have to do with diverse business interests carried by 
major traffickers. In addition to heroin, property deals, casinos, and contraband smug-
gling (specifically of tea, nuts, tobacco, and weapons) may have allowed such major 
traffickers as Hüseyin Eminoğlu and fahreddin Soysal to survive the ebb and flow 
of Turkey’s role in the drug trade.43 Starting in 1969, factional street violence aimed 
largely at Turkey’s labor/left escalated across Turkey.44 Underworld figures in Istanbul 
and elsewhere found themselves progressively drawn into this street conflict among 
young leftist and rightist militants. Out of this clash a new milieu emerged in Turkey, 
one that transcended political, criminal, and national lines. 
Perhaps the most representative figure to arise from this period is Abdullah Çatlı. 
Born in the central Anatolian town of Nevşehir in 1956, Çatlı’s youth was marked 
by transience and violent politics. In his early student years, he quickly ascended the 
ranks of the nascent neo-fascist Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar) movement, a movement 
founded by Alparslan Türkeş (a retired Cypriot general and founder of the National 
Action Party, who also allegedly helped organize the coup against Adnan Menderes in 
1960). At the age of 22, Çatlı was already implicated in the murders of several leftist 
intellectuals and activists in Ankara.45 fear of arrest and escalating violence led Çatlı 
to Istanbul, where he soon fell into a mixed circle of radical former military officers, 
right-wing party officials, smugglers, and covert agents. Among his first associates in 
Istanbul were gunrunners Abuzer Uğurlu and Bekir Çelenk, two men who also shared 
42. A comparative approach towards the history of organized crime, as a means of expanding 
the role of gangsters in the making of the modern world, can most recently be seen in Luis Astorga, 
Drogas Sin Fronteras [Drugs Without Borders] (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 2003); Cyrille fijnaut and 
Letizia Paoli, eds., Organized crime in Europe (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2004); Robert J. 
Kelly, ed., Organized crime: A Global perspective (Totawa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986). See 
also Luis Astorga, “Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime,” in John Baily and Roy Godson, 
eds., Organized crime and Democratic Governability: Mexico and the u.S. — Mexico Borderlands 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), pp. 58–82.
43. “Kaçakcılıktan Sanık Milyoner Tevkif Edildi” [“Accused Millionaire Arrested for Smug-
gling”], Milliyet, August 14, 1959.
44. Soner Yalçın and Doğan Yudakul, Reis: Gladio’nun Türk Tetikçisi [Boss: Gladio’s Turkish 
Triggerman] (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapcılık, 2007), p. 28.
45. Yalçın and Yudakul, Reis, pp. 57–69.
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deep connections with heroin smuggling operations in Bulgaria and Italy. During this 
crucial stage in his life, Çatlı also became acquainted with the same circles as Mehmet 
Ali Ağca, a Turkish assassin most famous for his attempt on the life of Pope John Paul 
II, and Henry Arslanayan, one of the most prominent heroin traffickers in the eastern 
Mediterranean.46 
Abdullah Çatlı’s activities, as well as his other associates, extended beyond the 
world of drugs. Beginning as early as 1979, Çatlı developed close relations with right-
wing circles in Turkish intelligence. According to Yalçın and Yurdakul, this relationship 
was possibly engendered with the mysterious murder of Abdi İpekçi, an outspoken 
journalist and critic writing for the newspaper Milliyet (a murder for which Mehmet 
Ali Ağca was arrested and imprisoned).47 It is now widely acknowledged that MİT 
employed Çatlı for a variety of violent and covert acts through the 1980s and 1990s. 
Although a complete accounting of his exploits cannot be confirmed, it seems reason-
ably clear that he played a role in the murder of several known Kurdish and Armenian 
militants and activists, as well as assisted in Ebulfeyz Elçibey’s coup in Azerbaijan in 
1995.48 
further complicating the history of Abdullah Çatlı’s various activities as both a 
state agent and a gangster is the even larger international apparatus that harbored him 
and coordinated his various assignments. At the root of Çatlı’s career in the Turkish 
clandestine service was the creation of a “stay behind” unit operated by various intel-
ligence services associated with NATO. “Operation Gladio,” as it was revealed in the 
1990s, comprised a deliberate partnership between notable figures within the interna-
tional underworld (most notably drug traffickers) and various state security services. 
Under the direction of the NATO consortium, hired guns like Abdullah Çatlı (as well 
as Ağca, Uğurlu, and Çelenk) were employed to suppress or eliminate “subversive” 
leftists or dissidents living in various NATO member states.49 Çatlı himself visited Mi-
ami in 1982 in the company of a known Gladio agent (and Italian neo-Nazi) and was 
considered “under the protection” of the CIA.50
In 1996, Çatlı’s double life as both a trafficker and government-backed assassin 
46. Yalçın and Yudakul, Reis, pp. 75–80, 127–128.
47. Yalçın and Yudakul, Reis, pp. 82–90.
48. Yalçın and Yudakul, Reis, pp. 156–159, 165–168, 230–232, 237–239.
49. Belma Akçura, Derin Devltet Oldu Devlet [The Deep State was the State] (Istanbul: Güncel 
Yayıncılık, 2006), pp. 34–55; Yalçın and Yudakul, Reis, pp. 132–134. In a fascinating interview given 
to Belma Akçura, Yavuz Ataç, a former high-ranking military officer and contributor to Operation 
Gladio, explained in detail the recruiting efforts that led to Alaattin Çakacı, one of Turkey’s most 
notorious heroin traffickers, to join the Turkish clandestine service. Ataç admits in the interview that 
Hiram Abas had been long acquainted with Çakacı before he was approached. 
50. Yalçın and Yudakul, Reis, pp. 152–156. Langley’s reliance on and interest in right-wing or neo-
fascist activists dates back to the closing years of World War II. In addition to sponsoring the activities 
of former Kuomintang and Shan militants in Burma (who were also among the chief suppliers of raw 
heroin in southeast Asia until the 1990s), the CIA also maintained an active profile in harboring and 
training former Nazi sympathizers from the Ukraine and Belarus for espionage purposes in the Soviet 
Union. for further discussion on the history of the CIA’s relationship with right-wing or neo-fascist 
organizations, see Herman and Brodhead, The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian connection, pp. 61–64; 
Jonathan Marshall, “Opium, Tungsten and the Search for National Security,” Journal of policy His-
tory, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1991), pp. 44–67.
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was revealed to the public in dramatic fashion. His corpse, pulled from a mysterious car 
wreck in the town of Susurluk, was discovered along with Istanbul’s deputy chief of po-
lice and a known right-wing Kurdish militant. A broad state inquiry followed, complete 
with admissions as to the nature of this alliance between criminal syndicates, state secu-
rity personnel, and right-wing politicians. Tansu Çiller, then-Prime Minister of Turkey, 
was unfazed by the allegations, calling those “who killed for the state” heroes.51
Since the “Susurluk incident,” the spectre cast by Operation Gladio and other 
alliances of this kind persists in Turkey.52 Observers both inside and outside of Turkey 
have also drawn attention to the connection between drug traffickers and the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), which allegedly controls the supply of heroin entering the coun-
try from Afghanistan and other portions of central Asia.53 
THE GEnEALOGy OF THE “DEEp STATE:” HEROIn, pARAMILITA-
RISM, AnD THE HISTORy OF TuRkEy
What do we make of these various connections that defined the life of individu-
als like Abdullah Çatlı? How do gangsters, politicians, smugglers, military officers, 
and clandestine agents all end up in the same boat? In order to describe this intricate 
relationship, Turkish commentators have coined the term the “deep state.” The precise 
meaning of this term, from the Turkish point of view, remains somewhat elusive. In 
2005, former Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel stated somewhat cryptically that “the 
deep state is the military. The deep state is the state itself.”54 I would opt for a broader, 
more complex definition. The deep state represents the political interplay between un-
acknowledged or unrecognized factions inside and outside the regular government. The 
deep state is not an entirely monolithic entity that shadows the bureaucracy, military, 
or civil society. Rather it is an eclectic, ever-evolving political theater of competition, 
one that includes elements both explicitly legal and outlaw in nature. Paramount to the 
operation and survival of the deep state is the extreme emphasis placed upon state secu-
rity, a need that places both law enforcement and clandestine agencies in the forefront 
of both the formulation and execution of state policies.55 
51. frank Bovenkerk and Yücel Yeşilgöz, “The Turkish Mafia and the State,” in Cyrille fijnaut 
and Letizia Paoli, eds., Organized crime in Europe (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004), pp. 595–596.
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story. for more recent turns in the evolution of the Turkish “deep state,” see Gareth Jenkins, “Between 
fact and fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation,” Silk Road papers (Washington, DC: Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies, 2009), pp. 1–84.
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54. Akçura, Derin Devltet Oldu Devlet, p. 16.
55. for further discussion, see Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire and the Future 
of America (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), pp. 4–7; Ola Tunander, “Demo-
cratic State vs. Deep State: Approaching the Dual State of the West,” presented at Government of the 
Shadows: Global Governance, para-politics and Organized crime, Asian Law Centre, University of 
Melbourne/Monash University, Melbourne, August 10–12, 2006, pp. 1–2.
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cOncLuSIOn
In this article I have attempted to lay the foundations for a deeper historical ex-
cavation of two critical elements of what we can call the Turkish deep state. These two 
elements, heroin trafficking and organized crime, in many ways evolved independently 
from one another. In recent times however, heroin and organized crime have come to 
overlap. As these two Anatolian tangents have grown closer, violence within the Turk-
ish political arena has increased. Upon closer inspection, trade in opiates and organized 
crime are not incidental to or exclusive of Anatolia’s transition from an imperial hin-
terland to national core. I would instead suggest that both phenomena have provided a 
platform for a variety of actors seeking to contest and shape the Turkish state.
Since the 19th century, opium, morphine, and heroin have become staple products 
critical to Anatolia’s economy. The proceeds from this trade have sustained the liveli-
hoods of agricultural workers, merchants, politicians, and criminals alike for over two 
centuries. After several decades of foreign dominance, Ankara has fought very hard in 
one form or another to maintain this industry in both its legal and (arguably) illicit forms. 
Shifts in the value and legality of opium-based products have forced Turkish producers 
and dealers to evolve with the conditions of the times. Even with Anatolia’s transforma-
tion from a center of opium production to an essential node in the heroin exchange, the 
trafficking industry has remained and grown more entrenched and complex. Turkey’s 
resilience over the years begs further inquiry into how suppliers and producers in Turkey 
reinvented themselves (particularly between the 1960s and 1980s). The answer to this 
question, I would argue, lies in the history of organized crime in Anatolia. 
Gangs in Anatolia did not always deal in heroin. Through the passage of both 
Ottoman and Turkish history, they occupied a schizophrenic position within society, 
operating as either willing agents or adversaries of the state. The emergence of a clan-
destine governmental apparatus, beginning with the Special Organization, complicated 
and expanded the roles played by criminal syndicates and paramilitaries. As both Istan-
bul and Ankara sought to consolidate and amplify their influence inside and outside of 
the state’s borders, gangs came to be seen as a valuable, yet disposable, tool to imple-
ment a variety of policies that were contrary to the rule of law (such as mass murder and 
the suppression of dissidents). The increasing proceeds gleaned from the heroin trade 
have intensified the strength, organization, and lethality of Turkish criminal cartels, 
making them more self-sustaining and international in size and authority. Actors wish-
ing to promote or contest state policy (be it Tansu Çiller or the PKK) have not ignored 
this trend. As well-financed and well-connected organizations with violent proclivities, 
heroin rings in Turkey have become powerful allies and agents in the Turkish political 
arena. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Turkish deep state is the presence of 
criminal syndicates that have their own articulate political notions and agendas. In this 
regard, it is important not to dismiss individuals like Abdullah Çatlı as simple-minded 
lackeys. Through his personal wealth, reputation, and connections, Çatlı was both a 
conductor and a tool of political change.
Looking beyond Turkey, it is important to remind ourselves of the near-universal 
nature of this type of cooperation between political and criminal networks. Too often 
the focus has been placed upon third world nations, particularly those labelled “narco-
states.” One need not go as far as to look at Afghanistan, Colombia, or Mexico. Indeed 
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the paths taken by narcotics traffickers, gangsters, and politicians have and do intersect 
in such powerful states as the United States, france, and China. More importantly, one 
must not ignore the roles played by intelligence services in sheltering or promoting 
foreign alliances made between members of the criminal underworld and the legitimate 
political and economic worlds. As historians continue to probe the evolution of the 
modern nation-state, it is essential for us to continue to break taboos and delve further 
into all aspects that inform and resist prevailing political and economic norms.
